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The technolgical possibilities of a realistic eavesdropper
are discussed. Two eavesdropping strategies taking profit of
multiphoton pulses in faint laser QKD are presented. We
conclude that, as long as storage of Qubits is technically im-
possible, faint laser QKD is not limited by this security issue,
but mostly by the detector noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Cryptography or Quantum Key Distribution
[1,2] offers provably secure key exchange [3]. Even for
unlimited technological power of the eavesdropper, Eve,
and technically limited devices of the legitimated users,
Alice and Bob, the privacy of the exchanged key can be
guaranteed.
In principle, single photons are sent from Alice to Bob.
A quantum degree of freedom (e.g. polarization) is used
to encode a bit value (0 or 1). In practice, single pho-
tons are often mimicked by faint laser pulses containing
on average much less than one photon per pulse. Hence,
multiple photon pulses occur and open the door to effi-
cient eavesdropping strategies that threaten the security
of Quantum Key distribution, especially in combination
with high losses in the fiber link [4]. In particular, sup-
pose that:
i) due to losses in the fiber link, the fraction of pulses
arriving at Bob links is smaller than the fraction of pulses
containing more than one photon leaving Alice,
ii) Eve possesses a lossless fiber link from Alice to Bob,
iii) Eve can measure the number of photons without
perturbing them (QND-measurement) and
iv) Eve can store photons without perturbing them for
minutes.
In this case, Eve could measure the number of photons
of the pulse. If there are less than two, she simply blocks
the pulse. If there are more than one photon, she stores
one of them and sends the other ones to Bob. After
Bob and Alice announced the bases of the measurements,
Eve measures her photons in the right bases and gets
the full information. She does not create any errors and
the average number of photons arriving at Bob remains
unchanged.
In this paper we would like to discuss the security
of faint laser QKD. We put emphasize on the multi-
photon problem, considering realistic set-ups with nowa-
days technical limits and realistic eavesdroppers with
state-of-art or near-future technology, but no unlimited
technological power. For simplicity, we will restrict our-
selves to the well-known 4-states protocol BB84 [1].
As you can imagine, the points ii) to iv) above are
not easy to realize. There are no lossless fibers, no effi-
cient QND-measurements and no efficient storage of pho-
tons for more than µs nor transfer of the quantum degree
of freedom to another quantum system like an ion in a
trap. In section III we define the techniques a realistic
Eve might possess. Nevertheless, using almost feasible
techniques efficient eavesdropping is possible. Acting on
two-photon pulses, Eve has two possibilities: First, she
can apply an intercept-resend strategy making a mea-
surement on both photons and sending a new photon to
Bob according to the obtained result. In section IV we
develop this strategy and calculate Eve’s information per
created bit error. Second, she can measure one photon
and let pass the other one unchanged to Bob. In this case
she won’t introduce any errors, but she alters the photon
statistics at Bob. In section V we calculate Eve’s infor-
mation as a function of the number of 2-photon pulses at
Bob. In section VI, finally, we discuss the consequences
of these eavesdropping strategies on the privacy ampli-
fication, the net bit rate and the maximal transmission
distances.
In the next section we sum up the basics equations
giving bit rates and photon number probabilities.
II. TRANSMISSION RATES AND PHOTON
STATISTICS.
Alice produces coherent states with a low mean pho-
ton number µ which are only an approximation of single
photon Fock-states. The probability that one finds n
photons in a coherent state follows the Poisson statistics:
P (n, µ) =
µn
n!
e−
µ
(1)
In a second order approximation we obtain:
P (0) ≈ 1 − µ+ µ
2
2
P (1) ≈ µ− µ2 (2)
P (2) ≈ µ
2
2
(3)
1
Accordingly, the probability that a non-empty pulse con-
tains more than 1 photon becomes:
P (n ≥ 2|n > 0) = 1− P (0)− P (1)
1− P (0) ≈
µ
2
+
(
µ2
4
)
(4)
The probability to have at least one photon is 1−P (1) =
1− e−µ. Consequently, the probability to have a (single)
count at Bob is:
Psingle = 1− e−
µtabηb ≈ µtabηb (5)
where µ has been replaced by µtabηb, with tab the trans-
mission of the optical fiber and ηb the detection efficiency
of Bob’s photon counter. The raw bit rate (before sifting,
error correction and privacy amplification) is simply
Rraw = υPsingle ≈ υµtabηb (6)
with the pulse frequency ν.
We can express tab in terms of the total loss Lab (in
dB), the product of αab (in dB/km) and lab, the length
of the fibre in km.
tab = 10
−Lab
10 = 10−
αablab
10 (7)
Eve’s attacks must leave Psingle unchanged. Eve can
make a beam-splitting attack (coupling out a fraction
λ) and increase the fiber transmission up to te. Thus,
she obtains:
λte = λ10
−αele
10 = 10
−αablab
10 = tab (8)
Bob has two detectors per basis. Whenever he mea-
sures in a non-compatible basis, he has a certain probabil-
ity to obtain a coincidence count. In the non compatible
basis, the polarizing beamsplitter acts like a normal 50%
coupler and we have on average µ2 tab photons in each
arm. Accordingly the probability to have a click in both
detectors becomes (the factor 12 is for the probability to
choose the wrong basis):
Pcoinc =
1
2
[
1− e−
µ
2
tabηb
]2
≈ 1
8
µ2t2abη
2
b ≈
1
4
P (2)t2abη
2
b
(9)
This is in first approximation equal to the intuitive calcu-
lation, taking simply the product of the probabilities to
have two photons P (2), the probability they arrive both
at Bob t2ab, the probability that the non-compatible basis
is chosen 12 , the probability that photons do not go to the
same detector 12 , and finally the probability that both are
detected η2b . (In the case of passive choice between the
two bases, we find a factor of 58 instead of
1
4 ). Again, Eve
must make sure that due to her intervention the number
of coincidences is not changed.
III. THE TECHNOLOGY OF A ”REALISTIC”
EVE
In this paragraph, we present the technology at the dis-
posal of a ”realistic” Eve. We consider technolgies that
are either state of the art or are imaginable with unlim-
ited financial possibilities in the near future. It is impor-
tant to note, that Eve can only take profit from the tech-
nologies available at the moment of key exchange. This
is in contrast to the public key system, where messages
that should remain secret for a long time are also threat-
ened by future technologies. For simplicity, in some cases
when there is no important consequence for the efficiency
of her attacks, we attribute to Eve perfect technology.
A. Eve’s infrastructure and optical components
Eve has free access to Alice and Bob’s quantum chan-
nel at any point outside their offices. She can install
optical components (switches, couplers etc.) without be-
ing noticed. Eve’s components have no losses and no
backscattering and are therefore invisible. Her optical
switches are arbitrarily fast. In particular, she can in ar-
bitrary short times recover the original situation when-
ever Alice and Bob check their line with an OTDR (op-
tical time domain reflectometer). She knows Alice and
Bob’s bases and can perfectly align her analyzers with
respect to these bases1.
B. Eve’s photon counters
Eve’s photon counters are perfect. They feature a
quantum efficiency of 1 and no noise. Moreover, they
can count photons arriving at the same time. Hence,
Eve can in particular distinguish between pulses contain-
ing one and two photons, but the measurement is de-
structive (no QND).
C. Eve’s fibre link
Eve doesn’t have lossless fibres. Nowadays telecom fi-
bres have reached a such a high quality level that the
losses in the second telecom window (@1550 nm) are
close to the theoretical limit. This means that a value
of 0.20 dB/km corresponds to the losses you expect from
1This is trivial in the cases where Alice and Bob use strong
classsical pulses to align their setups. In the auto-aligned
”plug&play” setup [12], the phase difference between the two
pulses is constantly fluctuating due to thermal instabilities.
Bob could even introduce a random phase for each bit, ren-
dering the task of Eve even more difficult.
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inevitable Rayleigh backscattering due to the different
molecules (essentially silica and germanium) present in
the glass. Fibers with a pure silica core have lower losses
(at the moment down to 0.171 dB/km [5]) but are actu-
ally not telecom standard. In contrary, real fibres have
additional losses due to splices and connections in the
centrals and a value of 0.25 dB/km is more realistic.
Moreover, installed fibres rarely follow the bee-line (dab)
(they often follow roads and go from one telecom central
to another). We assume that Eve possesses a fiber link
relating Alice and Bob on a straight line with a loss αe of
0.15 dB/km. Alice and Bob must measure the total loss
Lab of their link. Eve’s maximum transmission gain Gt
(Gt = 10log(
te
ta
)) is then Lab−αedab. If the time of flight
of the photons is monitored, Gt is only (αab − αe)lab,
which is according to our assumptions ≈0.1 dB per fibre
km. At any other wavelength Gt would be larger.
Note that Eve could introduce in advance additional
loss between Alice and Bob. Crypto users must therefore
calculate the loss Lab and αab of their line from the ob-
tained Psingle and compare it to the usual values
2. The
higher the accepted loss is, the higher Gt, and as we will
see, the higher Eve’s information.
D. Eve’s photon sources
Eve possesses perfect single photon sources and more
general sources that can emit arbitrary states at demand.
Nowadays, such kind of sources are far from being re-
alized. However, admitting such sophisticated sources
has not much impact on the security and performance
of practical QKD systems, since in most cases only the
single photon and two-photon statistics can be measured
by Bob.
E. Eve’s possibilities to modify and influence Alice
and Bob’s apparatuses
In cryptography in general, Alice and Bob’s offices have
to be supposed to be secure. We also assume that Eve
cannot manipulate Alice and Bob’s crypto devices before
they get installed (or that they are quantum physicist
that can test them). This is not trivial, and in practice
crypto users have to trust their suppliers. However, due
to the optical fiber coming into the offices Alice and Bob
have to be aware of, what is sometimes called ”Trojan
horse” attacks. In such kind of attacks Eve sends light
pulses at arbitrary wavelengths and analyzes the reflected
light in order to find out e.g. which detector clicked or
which phase was applied. We assume that Alice and
2Note that a standard measurement of the fiber transmission
could be manipulated by Eve.
Bob applied all precautionary measures to prevent such
strategies. In the same line, we take it for granted that
Alice and Bob do not send any parasite signals that could
reveal their bits. The problem is not that these counter
measures are technically difficult to realize, but the prove
that all leaks have been plugged up.
All these assumptions are essential in the sense that
otherwise secure QKD is not possible. Another assump-
tion commonly made is that all bit errors detected by Al-
ice and Bob are introduced by Eve, and that she possesses
the corresponding information of the key. This means
that privacy amplification has to be applied to reduce
this potential information, which in turn, in the cases
of large quantum bit error rates (QBER), drastically re-
duces the bit rate. In practice also without any eaves-
dropping, QKD-systems suffer from considerable QBER,
that has two origins [6]. A first part, QBERopt, is due
to non perfect alignment of the optical setup e.g. the
polarization measurement bases of Alice and Bob are
not perfectly parallel, or the light pulses are not per-
fectly polarized. The second, and mostly dominant, part
is due to darkcounts of the photon counters. Attribut-
ing all QBER to the presence of an eavesdropper and
assuming that Eve gains the corresponding information
(see section III), means supposing that Eve has ways to
reduce QBERopt and QBERdet. Only diminishing these
errors allows her to tap the line and gain information
without introducing additional errors. On the one hand,
one can imagine that Eve can reduce QBERopt in cer-
tain cases, by improving e.g. the alignment of Alice and
Bob’s bases. One the other hand, reducing QBERdet i.e.
the dark count rate at a distance by sending some magic
light pulses is not conceivable. Therefore, we suggest
that only for the difference between the measured QBER
(QBERmes) and the presumed QBERdet privacy ampli-
fication must be applied. Typically, QBERopt is in the
order 0.5%. Thus, adding a tolerance of 0.5%, we may
attribute an error of 1% to Eve.
Similarly, we assume that Eve cannot increase the de-
tection efficiencies of Bob’s detectors. This would be very
useful for the eavesdropping strategy discussed in section
IV. Instead of lowering the losses in the quantum chan-
nel, Eve could then simply increase the efficiency of the
detectors (for the pulses, from which she was able to ex-
tract one photon), as suggested by Lu¨tkenhaus [4].
IV. STRATEGY A: INTERCEPT-RESEND WITH
MULTI-PHOTON PULSES
Eve intercepts all photons and analyzes them with the
setup shown in Fig. 1. She transmits the measurement
results through a (lossless) classical channel to a source
close to Bob that sends the most suitable states, respect-
ing the photon statistics expected by Bob. Eve sends the
photons via passive beamsplitter to both measurement
bases. Consequently, she obtains four different possible
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results (cases with more than 2 photons are neglected).
In table 1 the four different possibilities are listed with
the corresponding probabilities p (the conditional prob-
ability, provided that at least one photon is detected),
Eve’s information per bit I(A,E), the QBER she cre-
ates and the ratio of information per QBER. The case
A (one photon) corresponds to the standard intercept-
resend on single photon pulses [7]. Case B, two photons,
each in a different basis, is the most favorable one for
Eve. First, after the sifting process she will possess the
full information on the bit value. Second, by sending an
intermediate state, a linear combination of the two corre-
sponding states separated by pi4 , she will create a smaller
error (0.15) than in case A. Case C, both photons in the
same detector, is still favorable. In contrary, Eve will
discard if possible all events D, two photons is the same
(wrong) basis, where she gains no information at all.
case p I(A,E) QBER I(A,E)
QBER
A 1− µ2 12 14 2
B 12
µ
2 1 sin
2
(
pi
8
)
= 0.15 6.83
C 38
µ
2
2
3
1
6 4
D 18
µ
2 0
1
2 0
Of course, Eve has to make sure that the number of pho-
tons arriving at Bob remains unchanged. If the transmis-
sion of Alice and Bob’s quantum channel is lower than
the probability of getting case B, Eve will only send pho-
tons in this case. If this outcome is not abundant enough,
she will have to add pulses after detections of kind C and
finally of kind A and possibly even B. This is illustrated
in Fig. 2, where Eve’s information per bit error is given
as a function of fiber length. One can notice that from
a distance of about 65 km on, Eve can entirely rely on
case B and obtains therefore 3.4 times more information
per bit error than in the case A (usual intersept-resend)
that applies in the limit of very short fibers.
Eve pays attention to reproduce the same number of
coincidences at Bob, which is no problem according para-
graph III D.
V. STRATEGY B: MEASURING ONE PHOTON
OUT OF TWO IN A PULSE
The easiest way to take profit of two photons in a pulse
is to couple a fraction λ out of each pulse with a beam-
splitter and replace the original line with a line that has
lower loss, in order to compensate for λ (see Fig. 3).
Then clearly, the number of photons (and their statis-
tics) arriving at Bob remains unchanged and this attack
does not generate any errors. Nevertheless, Eve gains the
following amout of information:
I(A,E) =
µ
2
(2λ (1− λ)) 1
2
(10)
where µ2 is the probability to find two photons in a pulse,
2λ1 − λ is the probability that these two photons sep-
arate at the coupler (outcoupling probability of λ) and
finally the outcoupled photon has a probability of 12 to
end up in the right basis. We can see immediately that
this information is maximum (I(A,E) = µ8 ) for λ =
1
2 ,
corresponding to a gain Gt of 3 db. If (instead of only
one beamsplitter) many couplers and analyzers are used
in series, with a total coupling loss that equals Gt, the in-
formation can go up to µ4 . This value can be approached
for Gt & 6db.
In order to further increase her information, Eve must
favor the detection of two photon pulses. She introduces
therefore a shutter (see Fig. 3) that allows her to block a
fraction (1− γ) of the pulses, when she didn’t catch one
photon. In this way the photon distribution is no longer
Poissonian. The calculation of the photon distribution at
the entrance port of Bob, as a function of λ and (1− γ),
is straightforward but lengthy. The probabilty for pulses
containing n photons (n>0) is
P ′(n, λ, γ) =
1
n!
(1− λ)n µntne
[
(γ − 1) e−µ+(1−λ)(1−te)µ
+e−µ(1−λ)te
]
(11)
with the transmission of Eve’s fiber te. With
P ′single(λ, γ) ≈ ηbP ′(1, λ, γ) we obtain for Bob’s singles
count probability :
P ′single(λ, γ) ≈ (1− λ)µteηb
[
(γ − 1) e−µ+(1−λ)(1−te)µ
+e−µ(1−λ)te
]
(12)
This formula corresponds approximatively, to what we
obtain by simply adding up the probabilities for 1- and
2-photon pulses:
P ′single(λ, γ) ≈ teηb
[
2 (1− λ)λP (2)
+γ
(
(1− λ)P (1) + 2 (1− λ)2 P (2)
) ]
(13)
≈ (1− λ)µteηb [λµ+ γ ((1− µ) + (1− λ)µ)] (14)
The first term (inside the square brackets) is the favor-
able case, when there are two photons in the pulse and
one of them goes to the detectors. The second and the
third term correspond to 1 and 2 photons propagating to
Bob, respectively. This value must equal to Psingle given
in eq. [5] without spy. which is the e.g. case for γ = 1
when tab =
te
2 and λ =
1
2 . This case correspond to the
simple attack with a 3db coupler, presented at the top of
this section.
Eve can block all pulses without detection (γ = 0), as
soon as tab ≤ teµ4 . This is the case for µ = 0.1 when
Gt ≥ 16dB. Then, Eve get’s 50% of the information
without creating errors. This simple attack is almost as
efficient as an attack based on a complicated QND mea-
surement, where same result is obtained for tab ≤ teµ2 . If
Eve had at disposition some device for storing photons,
she could wait for the sifting process, then measure her
photons in the right basis and get 100% information. In
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consequence, this kind of attacks are very powerful as
soon Eve’s Gt is large.
However, by acting selectively on two-photon pulses
Eve changes the photon statistics and her presence might
be revealed by Bob’s coincidence measurements. Accord-
ing to eq.[9] Bob’s coincidence rate is Pcoinc ≈ 18µ2t2abη2b .
On the other hand with P ′coinc(λ, γ) ≈ 14η2bP ′(2, λ, γ) we
get:
P ′coinc =
1
8
(1− λ)2 µ2t2eη2b
[
(γ − 1) e−µ+(1−λ)(1−te)µ
+e−µ(1−λ)te
]
(15)
In order to fulfill the two conditions
P ′single = Psingle (16)
P ′coinc = Pcoinc
Eve can vary the parameters γ and λ. But we realize that
for γ 6= 1, Eve cannot satisfy both conditions. For equal
single counts, she always increases the number of coinci-
dences detected by Bob. If the effect of Eve’s interaction
was to reduce the coincidence count rates, she could add
from time to time photons at price of additional errors.
But reducing the number of coincidences without chang-
ing the bit rate, is impossible with linear optics (i.e. with-
out QND-measurement of the photon number). However,
the number of detected coincidences is small and statis-
tical fluctuation are large. In Fig. 4 we see Bob’s coinci-
dence counts as a function of γ, for 1010 pulses sent over
60 km. The horizontal lines are the coincidence rates
without Eve (Pcoinc), and ±2σ (Pcoinc ± 2
√
Pcoinc) vari-
ations. In the same graph Eve’s information is plotted,
too. We can readout the information Eve obtains, by in-
creasing Bob’s coincidence counts by 2 σ. I(A,E)is given
by
I(A,E) = γ
µ
2
1
2
2λ (1− λ) + (1− γ) 1
2
(17)
= γ
µ
2
λ (1− λ) + (1− γ) 1
2
where the two terms are Eve’s information for a non-
activated shutter (according eq. (10) ) and for an acti-
vated shutter (12 ), respectively.
VI. IMPACT OF MULTIPHOTON
EAVESDROPPING ON BITRATES AND
MAXIMUM TRANSMISSION DISTANCE
After the sifting process Alice and Bob correct the er-
rors in their raw key and apply privacy amplification in
order to reduce Eve’s information to an arbitrarily low
level. The efficiency of these processes depends of course
on the QBER and I(A,E), respectively [10,?]. So high
error rates have their consequence on the net bit rate
Rnet (or distilled bit rate Rdist), which is at the end, to-
gether with the transmission distance, the the only figure
of merit of QKD. Therefore it is helpful to plot Rnet as
a function of fiber length. Rnet decreases in a first time
exponentially (linearly in log plot) due to the fiber losses,
before at a certain point it rapidly falls to zero due to the
exploding losses due to the necessary error correction and
privacy amplification. This point, representing the max-
imum transmission distance, depends now on the estima-
tion of Eve’s information corresponding to her technical
possibilities. In practice, nowadays systems are essen-
tially limited by the detector noise, which leads to high
QBER at large distances. In order to make the impact
of the discussed eavesdropping strategies more transpar-
ent, and to estimate the limits of future systems with
improved detectors, we assume in the following graphs
a dark count probability of 10−6 instead of the actually
typical 10−5 [9]. We compare the impact of the pre-
sented strategies with the scenario of an Eve with un-
limited technological power as proposed by Lu¨tkenhaus.
The Lu¨tkenhaus curve is dropping down rapidly, because
whenever tabηb ≈ µ2 Eve’s information I(A,E) ≈ 1 and
almost everything of the key is lost by privacy amplifica-
tion. Therefore the curve is calculated with an optimal
µ which decreases with the transmission distance (loss).
This has in turn the same effect, that the Rnet is drop-
ping down. .
In Figure 5, we see Rnet as a function of distance for
strategy A for different values of µ. We assume Eve’s in-
duced error rate to be QBERmes−QBERdet ≈ 1%, and
I(A,E) corresponding to this error has to be corrected.
The maximum transmission distance is not considerably
reduced with respect to an analog curve without multi-
photon attacks, or to the shown curve without eaves-
dropper (no privacy amplification). The reason is that in
the worst case (case B) we have to correct 6.8% of infor-
mation instead of 2% for single photon intercept-resend.
This means we will approximately loose 6.8% of the key
instead of 2%. However, the bit loss due the error cor-
rection is in comparison much more important. So we
can say for strategy A, multiphoton-pulses do not reduce
the maximum transmission loss, nevertheless we have to
be aware of the problem and apply the corresponding
privacy amplification.
Figure 6 shows the result for strategy B. We suppose
that I(A,E) corresponding to a 2σ increase of P ′coinc has
to be corrected. The difference with respect to the shown
curve without eavesdropping is small3. Rnet is not con-
siderably reduced since the maximum I(A,E) is 12 , which
reduces Rnet by a factor
4 of 2. This is illustrated by the
3This would be the same for lossless fibers (αe = 0dB) since
γ is not limited by the Gt but by the change in P
′
coinc (see
Fig. 4).
4QKD-systems that do not monitor Pcoinc must systemati-
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curve where photon storage is admitted and I(A,E) can
go up to 1, and therefore Rnet drops down faster. How-
ever, the transmission distance is only dramatically re-
duced, if photon storage is combined with conservation
of photon statistics, which asks for QND-measurements.
Therefore under realistic conditions, even if strategy B
is more efficient than strategy A, it does not limit the
transmission of faint laser QKD.
Our calculation give for both eavesdropping strategies
higher Rnet for higher µ. For strategy B, I(A,E) de-
creases with a increasing µ, since 2
√
Pcoinc
Pcoinc
decreases and
Eve’s presence is discovered faster. However, our calcu-
lation for strategy A is only correct for µ ≪ 1, indeed,
it becomes much more powerful for µ ≈ 1. We plan to
study the efficiency of this strategy for larger µ, in order
to optimize µ and hence the bit rate of faint laser QKD.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that also with realistic technologies
an eavesdropper can easily take profit of multi-photon
pulses. However, the impact on the maximum transmis-
sion distance is minor. In order to guarantee this, Bob
must survey the length of the fiber, its loss and the co-
incidence count rates in order to limit Eve’s information.
We think it is not reasonable to attribute all QBER to
Eve. Along the same line, in the case of increased QBER,
it might be better to check the causes, instead of simply
perform error correction and privacy amplification.
It is important to note, that QND-measurements
alone, does not allow dangerous multi-photon attacks.
The crucial point is whether Eve can store photons or
not. One can take for granted that it is impossible to
store millions of qubits efficiently for seconds in the near
future. Users who worry about that may just wait a few
minutes before proceeding with sifting. Therefore for the
time being, faint laser QKD has no security problem due
to multiphoton pulses. It is limited in distance by the
dark counts of the detectors. In conclusion, QKD using
entangled photons is not mandatory [8,13]5.
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X. FIGURE CAPTIONS
Fig 1: Eve’s setup for strategy A: S = optical switch,
PBS= polarization beam splitter, C = photon counter
Fig 2: Strategy A: Eve information I(A,E) accord-
ing to the different regimes (see table 1) as function of
distance, for αab = 0.25dB/km and µ = 0.1.
Fig 3: Eve’s setup for strategy B. S = optical switch,
PBS= polarization beam splitter, C = photon counter
Fig. 4: Strategy B: Eve’s information I(A,E) and
number of coincidences as a function of γ, under the
condition of unchanged single counts (P ′single = Psingle).
The parameters are: µ = 0.1, number of pulses 1010,
lab = 60km, αab = 0.25dB/km, αe = 0.15dB/km
Fig. 5: Strategy A: Normalized Rnet as a function of
distance for different values of µ. For comparison curves
with no eavesdropper (only error correction applied) and
an eavesdropper with unlimited technology (Lu¨tkenhaus)
are shown.
Fig. 6: Strategy B: Normalized Rnet as a function of
distance. The parameters are: µ = 0.1, number of pulses
1010, lab = 60km, αab = 0.25dB/km, αe = 0.15dB/km.
For comparison curves with no eavesdropper (only er-
ror correction applied) an eavesdropper with storage
device and an eavesdropper with unlimited technology
(Lu¨tkenhaus) are shown.
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